






Privatisation has been a key element of structural
reforms in most European Union countries,includ-
ing Austria during the last decade. Governments
undertaking privatisation have pursued several
objectives: achieving gains in economic efficiency
given the extensive prevalence of poor economic
performance of public enterprises in many coun-
tries and limited success with their reform; and
improving the fiscal position, particularly in cases
where governments have been unwilling or unable
to continue to finance deficits in the public enter-
prise sector. In addition, budgetary-constrained
governments, facing fiscal pressures, have some-
times privatised mainly to finance fiscal deficits
with the privatisation proceeds.
The issues of privatisation (and sometimes deregu-
lation) have been reviewed in a large literature on
the various aspects of privatisation, and this litera-
ture has emphasised the potential efficiency gains.1
The goal of this article is twofold: Firstly, to pro-
vide some theoretical reasoning as to why privati-
sation is useful and has occurred, and, secondly, to
illustrate the extent of privatisation in OECD
countries.
Reasons for privatising public enterprises
For at least the last century, economists have
employed a positive economic theory to explore
the implications of wealth maximisation by private
firms operating in private property contexts. Only
since the late 1960’s have empirical studies dealing
with the behaviour of publicly operated firms been
undertaken (e.g. Borcherding, Pommerehne,
Schneider, 1982; Boes and Schneider, 1996). Since
then a large number of studies of a variety of activ-
ities now exists, and their main focus is the ques-
tion of how public firms differ from their private
equivalents.
Basically two methods are employed. The first is
the property rights approach. It concentrates on
the differences in the ease of captureability of eco-
nomic surplus of a resource and the rights to direct
an asset’s use, alter its form or transfer its claims
among existent and potential owners. In short, this
approach explores the differences in incentives
between public and private agencies caused by
variation in the ability of owners to monitor man-
agement and the problems that emerge when the
goals of “owners” and their agents, “managers”
diverge.2 The second is the public-choice approach
and concentrates on political coalitions and their
effect on input usage and reward and/or product
characteristics. The public-choice approach also
includes the theory of bureaucracy (see Niskanen
1971 and 1975).
The property rights approach
The property rights approach points out one cru-
cial difference between private and public firms:
the practical difficulties in transferring ownership
rights among individuals in the public sector and
the relative ease of such transactions with private
assets which includes, of course, the ability of own-
ers (citizens) to monitor their agents’ (elected offi-
cials’ and bureaucrats’) behaviour. By now, this
approach, pioneered by Armen Alchian, is well
known,but it is useful to recall his predictions:gov-
ernment managers will not organise the inputs
under their direction in such a way as to maximise
the wealth of the ultimate owners, the general citi-
zenry.Alchian predicts, therefore, that public firms
will be less efficient, their management will enjoy
“quieter lives” and because of this the public will
give them lower levels of discretion than their col-
leagues in private firms. To put it another way, the
property rights approach is concerned with any
type of co-operation in which ownership and man-
agement are separate. The emerging principal-
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agent problem may be prevalent in private enter-
prises as well but to a much lesser extent.
Numerous studies have been undertaken that have
tested this proposition, and the result that public
enterprises are less efficient then private one is
confirmed in most of them.3
To sum up the results so far, the property rights
approach seems to indicate that (1) private pro-
duction is cheaper than production in publicly
owned and managed firms and (2) given sufficient
competition between public and private producers
(and no discriminatory regulations and subsidies)
the differences in unit cost turn out to be insignifi-
cant. From this one may conclude that it is not so
much the difference in the transferability of own-
ership but the lack of competition that leads to the
often observed and less efficient production in
public enterprises.
The public choice approach
The public choice approach appears to provide a
broader analysis than the property rights one.The
public choice approach assumes that politicians,
bureaucrats, managers of public enterprises are
selfish utility maximisers subject to constraints
(cf. Schneider and Frey, 1988, Bartel and
Schneider, 1991, Pardo and Schneider 1996, and
Schneider, 2002).
In this approach it is, for example, assumed that a
politician acts selfishly in order to reach his ideo-
logical or personal goals of not losing the next elec-
tion. Since staying in power is the most important
constraint for politicians (or sometimes the only
goal), they will also use public utilities for their
own selfish goals. One reason for this is evidently
the lack of incentives for politicians and taxpayers
to exert effective control of public enterprises or
efficient use of resources in the economy. This
argument seems especially valid for the case of
public utilities. Public utilities offer excellent
opportunities to reach the selfish re-election goals
of governments, like additional employment and
the stabilisation of purchasing power of certain
regions.4 If such a “misuse” of public utilities or
enterprises leads to full employment and higher
income at least for a certain time span then it is
easier for a government to win an election without
such a “misuse” of public utilities.The cost of such
a policy can be made invisible for several years (or
even one or two legislative periods) as the deficit
of the public enterprises can be hidden in the gen-
eral budget deficit.
As the public choice approach is more concerned
with micro-economic aspects, De Alessi claimed
that public managers are growth not wealth orien-
tated. He argued and found supporting evidence
that this leads to larger staffs and higher capital-
labour ratios since excess capital makes managers
and their subordinates’ productivity appear higher
to their monitoring agents, the legislature.Already
Borcherding, Busch and Spann (1977) argued that
public employees effectively coalesce through
their organisations and “capture”civil service com-
missions over time,altering rules in such a way that
effective supply of competing labour to public
firms becomes less wage elastic than a free market
buyer would otherwise face. This public employee
market power is enhanced, they claimed, by the
fact that public service employees contribute to the
election of the ultimate “bosses”, definitely not an
option for a private-sector union. In some sense
then,public employees can alter the position of the
derived demand schedule for their services by
(a) “nudging” the final demand schedule for public
services to the right and (b) by specifying rules
which lower both the elasticity of substitution
between themselves and rival factors and the elas-
ticity of supply of these close substitutes. Both
(a) and (b) will tend to raise wages, but they may
raise employment too, since, in effect, the budget
and tie-in effects may offset the usual substitution
effects one might derive out of the neoclassical
models of labour demand in the presence of a sim-
ple monopoly. De Allessi (1974) in another paper
argued that given the relatively loose monitoring
of public enterprises by the political review author-
ities, a rational position for the latter given the
gain-sharing results of assiduous monitoring, man-
agers will indulge their taste for security rather
more than in private firms.He found evidence con-
sistent with the risk-avoiding hypothesis. Public
managers’ tenures are more secure, of a longer
duration, and their fluctuations in real wages are
lower than their private counterparts.
In conclusion,according to the public choice schol-
ars, governmental agencies and firms have distinct
3 Compare the studies by Boes and Schneider (1996), Schneider
(1997, 2002), Schneider and Hofreither (1990).As these results are
so well known, they are not reported here.
4 For Austria, Upper Austria and Styria see Schneider (2002) and
Bartel and Schneider (1991).biases leading to higher production costs, just as
the property rights literature suggests, but exces-
sive outputs as well. The latter results because the
staff of the bureaucracy can effect demand more
readily under monopoly public ownership by the
strength of its members’ votes and/or lobbying
efforts. The absence of a civil service and the con-
straint on strong unions under more competitive
types of supply, public or private, is thought to
reduce the ability of members of such bureaucra-
cies to offer their services to the legislature on dis-
advantageous terms compared to potential com-
petitors. On the other hand, the bureaucracy is not
likely to have sole “capture” rights over the
bureaus, but share the ownership claims with other
interests.
To sum up, the public choice approach not only
recognises the differences in behaviour between
publicly owned and managed firms and private ones
due to the limited transferability of ownership. It
also considers the likely oversupply of public ser-
vices due to the lack of competition in their provi-
sion and production. This oversupply is then quite
often used for selfish re-election goals of politicians
and can result in higher employment and higher
wages in certain regions for a certain time.5
Summarising the two approaches, one clearly
comes to the result that, as already noted in the
introduction, there are various reasons to privatise
public utilities or enterprises in order to stop the
misuse of such policies.
The amount of privatisation in OECD countries
Privatisation and proceeds from privatisation have
been substantial all over the world. Even since the
beginning of the 1960s, numerous instances of pri-
vatisation in market-orientated, industrial coun-
tries, but also in transition and developing coun-
tries, have been taking place.
A detailed picture of the privatisation proceeds of
single countries is given in Table 1.
In the beginning of the 1990s a real wave of pri-
vatisation began to develop. In most countries the
wave peaked in the second part of the 1990s.
Austria, for example, obtained proceeds from pri-
vatisation in 1990/91 of only $80 million, but in
1996/97 it was $3.9 billion. Germany started with
proceeds of $325 million in 1990/91, but obtained
$14.3 billion in 1996/97.An exception is the United
Kingdom, where in 1990/91 already a peak of pri-
vatisation proceeds had been reached ($34.7 bil-
lion). But also the later revenues from privatisa-
tion have been substantial.
If one considers standardised figures of privatisa-
tion of state-owned enterprises as a percentage
of GDP in the year 2000 (column 9 of Table 1),
the figures presented there cover a wide range.
Apart from Hungary, which was a non-market
economy with a large state sector, it is Portugal
which has reached by far the highest amount f
privatisation proceeds over the period, namely
20.2 percent of GDP in 2000. Considering some
developed OECD countries,New Zealand reach-
es 13.9 percent, followed by Greece with 8.8 per-
cent, Italy with 8.2 percent and Ireland with
7.2 percent.
If one looks at the highest amounts of privatisation
proceeds during the 1990s,Italy ranks first with $98
billion, followed by Australia with $79 billions, by
France with $74 billions, the United Kingdom with
$64 billion and Japan with $61 billion. In general,
Table 1 clearly shows that privatisation in OECD
countries of the Eastern and Western type was a
major issue in the 1990s.
A special method of privatisation is through public
share offerings.6 In Table 2 figures for a longer time
perspective and for a special privatisation issue,
namely privatisation of state-owned enterprises
through public share offerings, are given.
Over the years 1961-2000, the largest amount of
privatisation of state-owned enterprises through
public share offerings happened in Japan with
$ 146 billion, followed by Great Britain with
$ 98 billion, by Italy with $85 billions and France
with $ 84 billions. Germany had only an amount
of $ 46 billions of privatisation proceeds of
state-owned enterprises through public-share
offerings.
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.In general,Tables 1 and 2 clearly demonstrate that
privatisation was a major issue, especially in the
1990s.
Summary and conclusions
Privatisation has certainly been a key-element of
structural reform in the OECD but also in the
European Union countries, including Austria, and
proceeds from privatisation have been substantial in
most of these countries. Gross receipts that can be
transferred to the budget are affected by actions prior
to sale, the sales process and the post-privatisation
regime.An evaluation of the potential uses of privati-
sation receipts or proceeds should reflect the implica-
tions for government net worth and their macroeco-
nomic impact.As far as government net worth is con-
cerned, proceeds from privatisation do not often
themselves indicate that the government is better off.
Privatisation has longer-term implications in terms of
revenues forgone and/or expenditures that will not be
made in the future. Government decisions on the use
of proceeds should reflect these long-run effects.
Government net worth will rise to the extent that pri-
vate sector ownership leads to an increase in efficien-
cy and the government shares in this gain.
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